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Finkelstein and Friedberg point out some of the peculiar results one
may reach in measuring the impact of mergers on concentration if con-
centration is measured by the share of output produced by a fixed num-
ber of firms. Their complaints are justified and could be enlarged.
They then proceed to offer an "entropy" measure of concentration
which summarizes the entire size distribution of firms, and lends itself
to an estimate of the impact of a merger on concentration. I shall
comment briefly upon their measure, but first some fundamentals.
A good measure of concentration has the property of increasing with
the probability of possession of effective monopolistic power by the
firms in the industry. I assume this purpose for the measure, but would
be prepared to defend it if an alternative purpose were proposed.
There are innumerable possible measures of concentration: number
of firms, "the" concentration ratio, slope of the Pareto curve, etc. There
are only two persuasive bases for choosing any one measure:
(1) A theory of economic behavior which tells us which factors gov-
ern the probability of monopolistic behavior by the industry.
(2) A quantitative investigation which reveals that the proposed
measure of concentration is well correlated with some accept-
able measures of monopoly power (profit rates, extent of price
discrimination, etc.)
Obviously the ideal measure of concentration will meet both tests; it
will be derived from a theory which itself has been well tested.
By the standards of plausibility which support most measures of
concentration, the Finkelstein and Friedberg measure of entropy is
both stimulating and appealing. The main criticism I would make of
their proposal is that it lacks any precise theoretical rationale.1 Their
first derivation is based upon the assumption that the "competitive
pressure" on a firm depends only upon the total share of other firms.
The concept of "competitive activities" does not exist in economics
and they give no explicit definition. Their second and third derivations
are based upon shifts of customers among firms. This is a more prom-
t Professor of Economics, University of Chicago.
1. I cannot refrain from dissenting from their sporadic use of court decisions in
judging among concentration measures. Since the judges ignore economics, surely we
economists should be allowed to ignore judges.
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ising approach, I believe, but they do not relate the shifts to price or
other behavior of the firms. I do not doubt that eventually an economic
rationale for their measure will be found. We shall then be better able
to judge it. My colleague Henri Theil, I may add, is far advanced on
a book on information theory in economics which uses an entropy mea-
sure of concentration.
I have sought to derive a measure of concentration from a theory
of collusion which turns upon the difficulty of policing any collusive
agreement.2 This argument turns on the behavior of the sales of each
firm over time and leads to a familiar index of concentration, the
Herfindahl index. This index is defined as
H = Is
where s, is the share of firm i. The index has a maximum value of 1
(monopoly) and a minimum value of 1/n when there are n firms of
equal size. A concentrated industry such as automobiles will have an
index of say .4, an unconcentrated industry an index of say .05 or
less. A few scraps of empirical evidence were offered in behalf of this
measure.
The Herfindahl measure is well-suited to the measurement of the
impact of a merger on concentration. If two firms with shares s, and
si join, the industry rises by
(s,+sJ)2--s--sj2=2 s, sj
Hence a merger of firms with .9 and .1 increases concentration by
2 X .9 X .1 = .18, whereas with shares of .1 each, the contribution is
2 X .1 X .1 = .02. If 1,000 firms merge into 100 firms (all equal in size),
the index rises from 1/1000 to 1/100 or by .009; if 100 merge into 10,
the index rises by .09; if ten merge into a monopoly, the index rises
by .9. The role of mergers in seven large American and British indus-
tries is measured by this technique in a forthcoming article.3
A full theory of monopoly may well go beyond the size distribution
of firms. The concentration of buyers (Hu), on my theory, is equally
important, and a better measure of concentration would perhaps be
H3
because the higher the concentration of buyers, at least if it is less than
2. See Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. OF Po. EoN. 44-61 (1954).
3. The Effects of the Antitrust Laws, 9 J. OF LAw & EcoN. (1966) (unpublished).
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the concentration of sellers, the closer the market will be to compe-
tition.
The Herfindahl index would rank the various mergers discussed by
Finkelstein and Friedberg in the same way as their entropy measure.
Until we have a better theoretical and empirical basis for concentra-
tion measures, however, this agreement is no proof of the joint pos-
session of virtue.
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